Politics and Policy Marine INcident Result of Being in Iraq Too Long (May 30, 2006) The poster who goes by "Roger Rabbit" on "HorsesAss.com" made an excellent point about the recent allegations against U.S. Marines in Iraq. I couldn't have said it better, so just go to the link below and scrool down to comment # 37: HorseAss.com Open Thread-Comment #37 I couldn't agree more with his comments – it’s an incident which isn’t reflective of the Marines in general, by a long shot (no pun intended). The problem is that incidents like this are the inevitable consequence of staying too long in a country we should have left as soon as possible. Knowing a little bit about the history of Iraq, when the war started I prayed that Bush would have enough sense to go in, unseat Saddam, and get out - preferably within ninety days of Saddam being gone. Anything longer than that will inevitably cause additional problems, including making Iraq a recruitment tool/training base for a new generation of anti-American terrorists. Bush is under the mistaken impression that the longer the U.S. stays in Iraq, the better off it will be. The opposite is true. We are paying for a generation's worth of Republican mistakes in the Middle East. Rumsfield thinks he is a modern-day Kissenger or Meternicht, but he only leaves disaster in his wake. Examples: 1. During Reagan administration, U.S. Marines sent as "peacekeepers" to secure Beirut airport during the Lebanese Civil War. It was a fool's errand - they were in an indefensible position with no clear instructions what they were supposed to do, other than be sniper targets. Then the USS Missouri was ordered to shell the Lebanese mountains in support of "Christian" militias against Muslim militias. I guess the thought the Muslims would somehow think the Marines are different from the Navy, and leave them alone? Apparently they didn't see such a fine distinction - a suicide car bomb leveled the Marine barracks, killing quite a few Marines and leading to their withdrawal. 2. With Iran in the hands of fundamentalist zealots and Syria in control of most of Lebanon, the wise thing to do would be to keep out of the Iran/Iraq war, right? No, Rumsfield thinks he can play both sides of this successfully. There is a "tilt" toward Iraq (which started the conflict in violation of the UN Charter), and U.S. intelligence info is fed to the Iraqis. At the same time an "arms for hostages" deal feeds arms and spare parts to the Iranians. When it becomes public, both sides are pissed at the U.S. 3. The U.S. tries to ensure Iraqi oil shipments by having the U.S. Navy protect against Iranian gunboats. But an Iraqi pilot fires a missile into a U.S. destroyer, "by accident". No adequate explanation is given for the error, but no action is taken. Saddam believes the U.S. is a "paper tiger". 4. Saddam Hussein meets with U.S. ambassador to discuss situation with Kuwait. The U.S. ambassador makes ambivalent comments concerning the U.S. position, leading Saddam to conclude that the U.S. would not interfere with his planned invasion of Kuwait. When the U.S. condemned the invasion, the U.S. is embarrassed when Iraq releases the tape of the conversation. 5. The fist Persian Gulf War is a resounding military victory, and President George H.W. Bush has enough sense not to make a strike for Baghdad, because (a) the other Arab countries in the alliance don't want him to, and (b) nobody has a reasonable plan for what to do with Iraq if they conquer it. But to preserve his place in history Bush cuts the war off a few hours short, allowing quite a bit of Iraqi armor to return to Iraq, and in armistice negotiations no restrictions are made on helicopter travel. Then the U.S. encourages the Shiites and Kurds to revolt. They do so, but the Iraqi tanks and helicopters crush much of the rebellion, and the U.S. offers no assistance. The Kurds are cynical now, and the Shiites are pissed again. 6. When U.S. troops went to Saudi Arabia, the U.S. promised to keep them there only as long as they were wanted. But because of the continued threat posed by Iraq, the U.S. keeps asking Saudi Arabia to continue to allow U.S. troops stationed "indefinitely" in Saudi Arabia to keep watch on Iraq (a consequence of not finishing the business of the first war). But this causes serious problems in conservative Saudi society. Bin Laden, back in Saudi Arabia after leading a group in a successful guerrilla campaign against the Soviets, is offended that the infidels are contaminating his country (he is not alone in this), and uses his money and contacts to start a war against a new enemy - the U.S. (Clinton is also at fault for not finding a way to withdraw from Saudi Arabia earlier, and instead continuing the Bush Sr. policy). Fast Forward to 2001: 7. Since taking office, Bush Jr. has been looking for an excuse to finish what his father was not able to finish in Iraq. 9-11 provided the excuse he needed, and the relatively easy victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan made him feel that the U.S. military could accomplish anything. So he and his administration made a serious fundamental mistake in military intelligence gathering: they accepted as true evidence which supported what they wanted to believe, and ignored any evidence to the contrary. The "weapons of mass destruction" claim provided the "anti-terrorist" cover he needed to invade Iraq. Saddam did indeed want to create a nuclear bomb, but he had been contained and was unable to do so. 8. Bush Jr. ignored the wisdom of his father, and proceeded into Iraq lacking the two things Bush Sr. felt he needed. Bush Jr. did not go into Iraq with a coalition of Arab countries as allies. Instead, he had only one – Kuwait. Even Turkey refused permission to use bases on Iraq’s northern border, causing a last minute change in strategy. It seems the U.S. assumed that Turkey would eventually allow it to be used for an invasion route, but was quite surprised when Turkey did not bend to U.S. arm-twisting. Just as important, the administration had a plan for a military campaign against Saddam’s army, but apparently had no real plan for what to do after that – what we now refer to as the lack of an “exit strategy”. 9. The ground war was another military success, proving that a modern U.S. army could again defeat a WWII style army from a small nation. Bush declared "mission accomplished", and turned his attention to tax cuts for the wealthy, turning social security over to private stock brokers, etc. 10. In the meantime, the U.S. military and civilian administration were screwing up big time in Iraq. Quite a number of former generals had warned before the war that we didn't have enough troops in place, but Bush didn't head the warnings because he didn't want the political consequences of a larger callout of reserve and national guard troops, nor did he want to consider the ultimate e political third rail - conscription. As a consequence when the Iraqi military and government collapsed, social order quickly broke down and looting was rampant for days and weeks following. From the first days of occupation, the U.S. demonstrated that it couldn't maintain order in Iraq. Some prominent assassinations early on made clear that forming a pro-western government - or any real government - may be impossible. 11. The U.S. civilian administrators demonstrated early on that they had no idea what to do in Iraq. The first thing they did was disband the Iraqi army - without bothering to secure their weapons first. I know their officers aren't particularly trustworthy, but who thought this was a good idea? Take a country in chaos, release hundreds of thousands of young men with automatic weapons into the civilian population at a time when there is almost 100% unemployment (i.e., nothing for them to do), and give them no money or food, and expect that this is going to turn out well?????? Better to keep then in units, put them on construction projects, feed and pay them (keeping them somewhat content and providing money to the economy), and use them as the basis for a new security force. 12. The U.S. couldn't even decide whether the Iraqi civilians would be allowed to own guns. Iraq, as a society, has a gun culture similar to that of the rural U.S. - everybody has one, preferably an AK47, and they won't give it up easily. First the U.S. announces that the guns will be confiscated, then it reverses its policy. I'm not sure if the reversal was because the Iraqis complained that they would be defenseless without the guns to looters and terrorists (a valid claim, in the absence of any police force in the country), or because the NRA complained. Either way, it was clear evidence that the simplest issues related to the occupation hadn't even been considered, and experts on Iraq were not involved in the process. 13. It was very important to show the Iraqis that life without Saddam would be better than it was under his control. As for the economy, that meant getting people to work quickly. A simple solution would have been to get Iraqi contractors to work quickly in the rebuilding effort, injecting cash into the economy, encouraging the building of an Iraqi middle class, and giving them a stake in the success of the effort. The Bush administration paid lip service to this issue, but then in practice simply awarded most reconstruction projects to large U.S. companies (mostly Haliburton subsidiaries) to manage for themselves. Aside from rather amazing over-charging and (in some cases) outright fraud, these companies brought in Philippine laborers for lots of jobs which could have been handled by Iraqis. Result? The U.S. says it is using Iraqi oil money to fund the reconstruction, but the Iraqis see no benefit from it, and presume it must be stolen by the Americans. 14. When Saddam was captured, the best thing to do would have been to get him out of the country as soon as possible, and to turn him over to Kuwait for trial. They still had an open issue with him regarding the invasion, kidnapping, and killing of thousands of Kuwaiti civilians. Keeping him in Iraq and putting him on trial in Iraq was a burden the fragile Iraqi coalition government was in no condition to handle. But the Bush administration, staffed by idealists rather than realists, insisted on a trial by the Iraqi government representing “the people of Iraq”. The result has been a disaster - a venue for Saddam to spout his propaganda, and a target for insurgents to prove that no one - judges, prosecutors, witnesses, or defense lawyers - are beyond their reach. The fact that it has taken so long, with lengthy continuances, substitutions of judges and defense lawyers, makes one wonder if the judges are hoping the will last indefinitely - so they won't have to render a verdict until they know who will win the Iraqi civil war, already in progress. 15. Now, as the U.S. enters into its fourth year of occupation in Iraq, the life of the ordinary Iraqi is much worse than it was under Saddam. Unemployment is very high. Electric power is available only occasionally. Gasoline prices are high, and there are shortages. Religious violence has created refugees as mixed neighborhoods separate from one another. Many Iraqis are afraid to venture beyond their homes. The Al Quida in Iraq (which didn't exist before U.S. occupation) harasses U.S. troops and contractors with sniper fire and bombs. Iraqis indicating any willingness to cooperate with the Americans are kidnapped, executed, or bombed. Iraqis are in danger from many directions: from terrorists, from their own police, from U.S. forces. Conclusion: The U.S. policy in the Middle East has been mis-managed for the better part of the past quarter-century by two men who first entered U.S. government under the Ford administration, and left their mark on the middle east during the Reagan, Bush Sr., and Bush Jr. administrations: Cheney and Rumsfield. It is time for them, and their boss, to admit the enormity of their mis-management. The Republicans accuse the Democrats of being critics without ideas of their own, but with Iraq, the situation has been so muddled that I am beginning to believe no one - Democrats, and certainly not Republicans, can fix it now. It may be time to cut our losses and get out. (Posted by rhp6033)        Copyright 2006-2007 - Brookridge Associates Inc. All rights reserved.